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Abstract
Coevolutionary game dynamics is the result of players that may change their strategies and their
network of interaction. For such games, and based on interpreting strategies as configurations, strategy–
to–payoff maps can be defined for every interaction network, which opens up to derive game landscapes.
This paper presents an analysis of these game landscapes by their information content. By this analysis,
we particularly study the effect of a rescaled payoff matrix generalizing social dilemmas and differences
between well–mixed and structured populations.
1 Introduction
Studying evolutionary games can be seen as an attempt to address a long–standing and fundamental problem
in Darwinian evolution. How can the two seemingly contradictory observations be reconciled that we have
selective pressure entailing competition between individuals, but at the same time there is wide–spread
cooperative and even altruistic behavior among individuals (and also groups of individuals or even species)?
Evolutionary games set up mathematical models to discuss the question of whether, when and under what
circumstances cooperation may be more advantageous than competition. Such games define individuals
having behavioral choices to be players selecting and executing strategies. By linking the relative costs
and benefits of strategies to payoff (and possibly fitness), we obtain a measure of how profitable a given
choice is in evolutionary terms. This discussion crystallizes most prominently into considering so–called
social dilemma games, for instance prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD), stag hunt (SH), or harmony
(H) [7, 20].
Evolutionary games become coevolutionary if players may not only change their strategies, but also
their network of interaction [13]. Recently, an approach of modeling and analyzing coevolutionary games by
dynamic game landscapes has been proposed [15, 16], which allows to treat games within the fitness landscape
framework [14, 17]. The main advantage of such a game landscape approach is that a strategy–to–payoff
map can be defined for every combination of strategies and networks of interaction. Thus, a systematic
and quantitative evaluation of the expectable evolutionary dynamics becomes possible. In this paper, the
approach is extended by studying the information content of game landscapes. Generally speaking, the
information content measures the amount of information required to describe such a landscape. For instance,
if the landscape is rugged with a larger number of local peaks, the amount of information may be high.
If, on the other hand, the landscape is flat or has just a single, smoothly accessible peak, the amount of
information can be rather low. Thus, the information content gives a quantitative evaluation of how smooth,
neutral or rugged the landscape is. These topological features may subsequently be linked to the likelihood
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of evolutionary paths from a given initial point to target points on the landscape. In short, studying the
information content is a powerful method of landscape analysis [10, 11, 19, 21], which we here apply to
coevolutionary games.
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 recalls coevolutionary games and particularly discusses a
recently introduced rescaling of the payoff matrix to generalize social dilemmas [22]. Also, modelling inter-
action networks by d–regular graphs is addressed. Furthermore, it is shown that the strategies of players
and coplayers can be interpreted as configurations [5, 6, 15, 16] and given how such configurations relate
to strategy–to–payoff maps. In Sec. 3 the strategy–to–payoff maps are used to define game landscapes
for which the information content is analyzed. Numerical experiments are presented and discussed in Sec.
4. We particularly study how the information content relates to different social dilemmas specified by the
rescaled payoff matrix and how the game landscapes vary from a well–mixed population, where every player
interacts with all other players, to a structured population, where the interaction matrix imposes restrictions
as to who–plays–whom. A summary and concluding remarks end the paper.
2 Coevolutionary games, configurations, and strategy–to–payoff maps
Coevolutionary games of N players are specified by three entities: (i) the payoff matrix, (ii) the network
of interaction, and (iii) the strategy of each player [13, 15, 16]. For a game with two strategies, cooperate
(Ci) and defect (Di), the pairwise interaction between two players Ii and Ij , i 6= j, (which consequently are
mutual coplayers) yields payoff (pi, pj) described by a 2× 2 payoff matrix
(Cj Dj
Ci R S
Di T P
)
(1)
where T is temptation to defect, R is reward for mutual cooperation, P is punishment for mutual defection,
and S is sucker payoff for cooperating with a defector. Depending on the values and order of these 4 elements
of the payoff matrix (1), we have different social dilemma games. Several suggestions have been made to
rescale the payoff matrix (1) by freezing or linearly coupling its elements, which may reduce the four–
dimensional parameter space to a two–dimensional plane [22, 23], while preserving frequently–studied social
dilemmas such as prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD), stag–hunt (SH), or harmony (H). Following
Wang et al. [22], we may introduce two scaling parameters u and v to obtain a rescaled payoff matrix
( Cj Dj
Ci R P − (R− P )v
Di R+ (R− P )u P
)
(2)
where u = T−RR−P and v =
P−S
R−P . We require R > P , while T − R and P − S may change sign for having
different orders of (T,R, P, S), and thus different social dilemmas. Apparently, matrix (2) reduces to matrix
(1) by inserting u and v. However, by varying u and v for −1 ≤ u ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ v ≤ 1, we may traverse
a two–dimensional uv–parameter plane encompassing all the social dilemmas given above, but also some
intermediate forms, see Fig. 1. We obtain SD games for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ v ≤ 0, PD games for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, and so on. Thus, a rescaling by matrix (2) significantly eases analyzing the games across
social dilemmas. A square in the uv–plane generalizes the payoff matrix (1) and produces a multitude of
dilemmas that are significant and interesting in evolutionary game theory. Moreover, Wang et al. [22] have
shown that by the rescaling (2) fixation properties of the games over the uv–plane are fairly robust with
respect to the choice of R and P .
A second entity to describe coevolutionary games is the interaction network specifying who–plays–whom.
According to evolutionary graph theory [1, 18, 20], each player Ii belongs to a vertex i of an interaction
graph, while an edge connecting vertex i and vertex j shows that the players Ii and Ij are mutual coplayers.
Algebraically, the interaction network is described by the adjacency matrix AI ∈ [0, 1]N×N . The interaction
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Figure 1: Schematic description of social dilemmas in a uv–parameter plane, as defined by the rescaled payoff
matrix (2). The plane can be divided into four sections (identified by different colors) which correspond
to prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD), stag hunt (SH), and harmony (H) games. We define 6 lines
bisecting the parameter plane (two diagonal at u = v and u = −v, two vertical at v = −0.5 and v = 0.5,
and two horizontal at u = 0.5 and u = −0.5), which are traversed in the numerical experiments.
graph having an edge between vertex i and vertex j is equivalent to the matrix AI having an element aij = 1,
while aij = 0 indicates no interaction between the players Ii and Ij . With no self–play, all aii = 0. In a
computational approach, interaction networks can be modeled by different classes of Erdo¨s–Re´nyi graphs
(E–R graphs) [8, 9, 15, 16]. In this paper, we consider interaction networks in which each player has the
same number of coplayers. Thus, the interaction network can be described by a special E–R graph, a random
d–regular graph. Random d–regular graphs are particularly suitable for a computational approach involving
numerical experiments. There are Ld(N) different instances of d–regular graphs on N vertices that can serve
as interaction networks for N players with d coplayers each, thus offering to study the effect of changing
the setting as to who–plays–whom. Furthermore, there are fast and efficient algorithms for generating such
graphs [2, 3].
One of the questions we intend to study by the approach presented are the differences in game dynamics
between well–mixed populations of players, where every player has all other players as coplayers, and struc-
tured populations, where the interaction network allows each player only selected coplayers. Well–mixed
populations have a complete interaction graph. For any N > 1, there is LN−1(N) = 1 with exactly one
complete graph. To address the question of difference, we relate the results obtained for this graph with
results for graphs with 2 ≤ d < N − 2 coplayers.
The third entity needed for describing a coevolutionary game is the strategy vector pi(k), which comprises
of the N strategies pii(k) that players may use in a given round k of the game. Players may change their
strategies. In the following, such a strategy updating is modeled as a Moran process and a frequently used
updating rule, birth–death (BD) is studied [1, 18, 20], without any replacement restrictions. Other updating
rules with calculable transition probabilities [12] can be handled within the same framework, for instance
death–birth, imitation, or pair–wise comparison.
The strategy vector pi(k) can be understood as a configuration of the game [5, 6, 15, 16]. For any
finite number of players there is a finite number of configurations. For a game with 2 strategies, there are
` = 2N configurations, which equals the number of words with length N that can be built over a 2–letter
alphabet A, for instance the strategies cooperate and defect A = {Ci, Di}, for which we use the binary
code A = {1, 0}. Consider the example of N = 4 players with d = 3 coplayers each. There are 24 = 16
configurations. For instance, the configuration pi = (pi1pi2pi3pi4) = (0110) means that players I2 and I3
cooperate, while I1 and I4 defect. From such a configuration, the payoff of every player can be assigned
as follows [6]. A specific player, for instance I1, may choose to cooperate (pi1 = 1) or defect (pi1 = 0). Its
payoff depends on what the coplayers’ strategies are. The strategies of the remaining N − 1 coplayers can
also be understood as a configuration, which we may call a coplayer configuration pico to distinguish it from
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the (full) configuration pi comprising the strategies of all players. For any player Ii we may calculate the
local frequencies that the coplayers cooperate ω1i or defect ω
0
i . Return to example pi = (0110) and player
I1. The local frequencies of the coplayer configuration pico = (110) are ω11(110) = 2/3 and ω01(110) = 1/3.
Note that the local frequencies are independent of the choice of player I1’s own strategy. Further observe
that for the same full configuration pi = (0110), but the perspective of player I2, the coplayer configuration
is pico = (010), which entails different local frequencies (ω
1
2 = 1/3 and ω
0
2 = 2/3). From the local frequencies
of the coplayer configuration pico and the payoff matrix (1), the payoff pi of a player Ii can be calculated as
p1i (pico) = Rω
1
i (pico) + Sω
0
i (pico) (3)
for the player cooperating (pi1 = 1) and
p0i (pico) = Tω
1
i (pico) + Pω
0
i (pico) (4)
for the player defecting (pi1 = 0). Thus, for player I1 and the coplayer configuration pico = (110), we get
p11(110) = (2R+S)/3 and p
0
1(110) = (2T +P )/3. (It may be a matter of convention to normalize the payoff,
as here, by the number of coplayers d = 3, but it might be useful if we are to compare payoffs over varying
d.)
Calculating payoff by Eqs. (3) and (4) shows clearly and naturally that the player’s reward depends on
how frequent a certain strategy is in the population of coplayers, which is known as frequency–dependence.
Also, from a computational point of view, such a calculation has some interesting properties. (i) Payoff can
be calculated for all ` = 2N−1 coplayer configurations pico and all players, which gives a complete strategy–
to–payoff map, that is, for all full configurations pi. For instance, p11(110) = p1(1110) and p
0
1(110) = p1(0110),
while p12(110) = p2(1110) and p
0
2(110) = p2(1010), and so on. (ii) For a complete network of interaction, the
calculation is symmetric with respect to players. Any player interacts with coplayers whose strategies are
defined by the same coplayer configurations. (iii) The calculation is basically bit counting of a binary string,
also known as counting the Hamming weight, which has time complexity O(N). The calculation is further
eased by the fact that ω1i and ω
0
i are symmetric by ω
1
i + ω
0
i = d. (iv) The calculation of payoff is done
in two separable steps, first by computing the local frequencies ω1i and ω
0
i for every coplayer configuration,
second by Eqs. (3) and (4), which is a linear scaling. In other words, the payoff can be seen as a linear
parametrization of the local frequencies. This means, once we have ω1i and ω
0
i , calculating payoff for a
parameter plane generalizing a payoff matrix such as (2) becomes numerically less expensive. Finally, (v)
the calculation of payoff is shown for a complete network of interaction (and thus a complete adjacency
matrix), but can straightforwardly be extended to any d–regular graph.
Consider again N = 4 players but now d = 2 coplayers. The network of interaction is described by a
2–regular graph on 4 vertices, for which there are L2(4) = 3 instances. One of them is AI(1) =
(
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
)
.
With no self–play, the main diagonal of AI is all aii = 0. We may remove these aii = 0 and replace
the remaining aij = 0 by aij := o to obtain a coplayer adjacency matrix AIco(1) =
(
o 1 1
o 1 1
1 1 o
1 1 o
)
. The same
yields AIco(2) =
(
1 o 1
1 1 o
o 1 1
1 o 1
)
, AIco(3) =
(
1 1 o
1 o 1
1 o 1
o 1 1
)
for the remaining two instances. The i–th row of the coplayer
adjacency matrix describes if there is interaction of player Ii with the remaining players (aij = 1) or not
(aij = o). Thus, by observing 1o = 0o = o, we get for player I1, AIco(1) and pico = (110) the element–
wise product (110) ◦ (o11) = (o10). The Hamming weight discarding the element (o) in the string (o10)
gives the local frequency to cooperate as ω11 = 1/2 and the local frequency to defect as ω
0
1 = 1/2. Note
that for the same player I1 and the same coplayer configuration, the local frequencies might be different
for another interaction network. For AIco(3), we obtain (110) ◦ (11o) = (11o) with ω11 = 1 and ω01 = 0.
Thus, for coevolutionary games with varying interaction networks, the payoff of a player Ii may depend not
only on its own strategy, the coplayer configuration pico summarizing the strategies of the coplayers, but
also on the adjacency matrix AI . According to Eqs. (3) and (4) the payoffs are p
1
1(110) = (R + S)/2 and
p01(110) = (T +P )/2 for AI(1) and AI(2), but p
1
1(110) = R and p
0
1(110) = T for AI(3). The local frequencies
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and thus the payoff may (but does not have to) vary over different networks of interaction. Each network
of interaction may have its own strategy–to–payoff map. Also for varying interaction networks, calculating
payoff can be separated into two steps: (i) computing the local frequencies for all coplayer configurations,
all players and the AI ’s, and (ii) using Eqs. (3) and (4) and any payoff matrix for a linear scaling.
3 Game landscapes and their information content
The previous section has shown how for all players and each network of interaction a strategy–to–payoff
map can be constructed. We now define game landscapes from these strategy–to–payoff maps [15, 16].
Therefore, we calculate the fitness fi(pi) from the payoff pi(pi) for all strategy configurations pi and each
player Ii by fi(pi) = 1 + δpi(pi) with the intensity of selection δ > 0. We further observe that according to
the Moran process only one player may change its strategy at a given point of time. Thus, for N players
with configuration pi = (pi1pi1 . . . piN ), there are N possibilities for strategy updating. Put another way,
each configuration has N neighbors, and for a binary representation of configurations, the neighborhood
structure is Hamming distance of 1, denoted by H1d. Finally, we may combine all configurations pi to form a
strategy configuration space Π. Hence, for each interaction network specified by an adjacency matrix AI and
each player, we get a landscape ΛiΠ = (Π,H1d, fi(pi)) that maps configurations pi ∈ Π with a neighborhood
defined by Hamming distance H1d to fitness fi : Π → R. We may further process these landscapes ΛiΠ
to incorporate different strategy updating schemes, for instance BD. Based on transitions probabilities of
the updating scheme [12], a fitness function of a game landscape with BD updating can be obtained by
f(pi) := 11
2(1+exp (
α
N
∑N
i=1 φi(pi)))
where φi(pi) = fi(pi)/
∑2N
`=1 fi(pi(`)) and α > 0 is a sensitivity weight, see [16]
for details.
Suppose we intend to analyze this game landscape in terms of neutrality, smoothness and ruggedness
by making a finite number of observations that each records the fitness of a configuration. It has been
shown that these observations are particularly useful if they are the result of a random walk as such a walk
may capture fitness relations between neighboring configurations across the landscape [11, 21]. Thus, the
landscape analysis is based on a sequence
S = (f(pi0), f(pi1), . . . , f(piT−1)) (5)
of walk length T where each xi and xi+1, i = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2 are neighboring configurations according to H1d.
For calculating the information content we first convert of sequence S into a symbol sequence
Sic = s0s1 . . . , sT−2 (6)
of length T − 1, where the symbols si are taken from the set S = {−1, 0, 1}. Applying the fitness sequence
(5), the symbols si ∈ S are calculated by
si() =

−1, if f(pii+1)− f(pii) < 
0, if |f(pii+1)− f(pii)| ≤ 
1, if f(pii+1)− f(pii) > 
(7)
for a fixed  ∈ [0, E], where E is the maximum difference between two fitness values. The parameter 
defines the sensitivity of the symbol sequence Sic() accounting for differences in fitness. For example, if
 = 0, the sequence Sic() contains the symbol si = 0 only for a random walk on a strictly flat area. Hence,
 = 0 discriminates very sensitively between increasing and decreasing fitness values. By contrast, for  = E,
the string only contains the symbol si = 0, which makes any evaluation nonsensical. Thus, a fixed value
of  with 0 <  < E defines a sensitivity level with respect to the information gained from the landscape
structure. For defining the information content of the landscape, the distribution of subblocks of length 2,
sisi+1, i = 0, 1, . . . T − 3, within the sequence (6) is analyzed. These subblocks stand for local patterns in
the landscape. The probability of the occurrence of the pattern ab with a, b ∈ S and a 6= b is denoted by pab.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Information characteristics over the uv–parameter plane generalizing payoff matrices, see Fig. 1,
and encompassing relevant social dilemmas. (a)–(b): maximal information content hic, see Eq. (8); (c)–(d):
maximal partial information content mic, see Eq. (9). The underlying landscapes are based on: (a), (c): a
well–mixed population with N = 6 and d = 5 (and thus L5(6) = 1); (b), (d): a structured population with
N = 6 and d = 2 (and L2(6) = 70) for which a typical network is shown.
As the set S consists of 3 elements, we find 6 different subblock sisi+1 = ab with a 6= b within the sequence
Sic(). From their probabilities and a given sensitivity level  the entropic measure
hic() = −
∑
a,b∈S
a 6=b
pab log6 pab (8)
is calculated, which is called information content of the fitness landscape [11, 21]. Note that by taking the
logarithm with the base 6 in Eq. (8), the information content is scaled to the interval [0, 1]. It has been
argued that the information content (8) may be a good measures of ruggedness, but may not well capture
smoothness and flatness of a landscape [21]. As an additional measure, the partial information content
mic has been suggested [11, 21]. For calculating this measure, we remove from the symbol sequence (6)
any symbol si = 0 and any repeating symbols si = si+1 to obtain a “cleared up” sequence S
∗
ic. A length
comparison between S∗ic and the initial symbol sequence Sic gives the partial information content mic:
mic() =
|S∗ic|
|Sic| . (9)
In numerical experiments, it can be observed that the values of hic and mic may vary over , see also the
numerical experiments given in Sec. 4. It has been shown [10, 11, 19] that information about landscape
ruggedness and smoothness are most meaningful for the maximum information content hic = max

hic() and
the maximum partial information content mic = mic()|=0.
The procedure for calculating hic and mic may also be applied to coevolutionary games. Consider we
have a series of dynamic instances of ΛΠ imposed by varying interaction networks described by adjacency
matrices AI(κ). Interpreting these dynamic instances as dynamic landscape [16], a series of landscape
measures can be obtained. Thus, we get hic(κ) and mic(κ). Next section, numerical experiments are given
and discussed that analyze the information content of coevolutionary game landscapes.
4 Numerical results and discussion
The numerical experiments study coevolutionary game landscapes specified by the rescaled payoff matrix
(2) and varying interaction networks. Therefore, a set of adjacency matrices AI(κ) with given order and
degree are generated algorithmically [2, 3]. The number of different interaction networks may be very large,
even for a moderate number of players. For instance, for N = 12 players with d = 2 coplayers each, we have
L2(12) = 34.944.085 different networks [16]. Thus, it is not feasible to numerically evaluate all networks,
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which is dealt with by the magnitude of the set taken into account be bounded from above by G = 8.500.
For Ld(N) < G, the complete set is used. The game landscapes are calculated for the sensitivity weight
α = 5 and the intensity of selection δ = 0.25. The landscape analysis is done by a random walk of length
T = 10.000. The results are averaged over 50 independent walks. Preliminary experiments have shown no
dependence on the initial state of the walk, which makes it reasonable to assume that the landscapes are
isotropic. We vary the uv–parameter plane of the rescaled payoff matrix (2) by −1 ≤ u ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ v ≤ 1
to encompass all relevant social dilemmas, see Fig. 1, and use the parameter (R,P ) = (1, 0).
Fig. 2 shows maximal information content hic and maximal partial information content mic for a well–
mixed population (N = 6, d = 5) and a typical structured population (N = 6, d = 2) over the uv–parameter
plane. We find that the values for hic and mic vary more for d = 2 (structured) than for d = 5 (well–mixed).
This is a typical result and can also be found for all other interaction networks with N = 6 and d = 2
coplayers. For both d = 2 and d = 5, the values group along diagonals from north–west to south–east
in the parameter plane. This is in line with previous results showing that for instance fixation properties
such as the equilibrium fraction of cooperators also have such a diagonal grouping [22]. In addition, it
is conspicuous that the values have much similarity between the south–west and the north–east, but also
between the north–west and the south–east corner. This seems paradoxical at the first glance, as these
corners represent substantially different social dilemmas, see also Fig. 1 which shows H and PD games
along the south–west–to–north–east diagonal, and SD and SH games along the north–west–to–south–east
diagonal. However, a fitness landscape is basically a tool for analyzing evolutionary dynamics. Thus, the
results about game landscapes in Fig. 2 relate to game dynamics. Regarding game dynamics, there is
similarity between H and PD on the one hand, and SD and SH on the other, and to a much lesser degree
between for instance H and SH, or PD and SD. The game dynamics of H and PD games is characterized
by monomorphic Nash equilibria where players either all cooperate (H) or all defect (PD). In other words,
in H games cooperation simply dominates defection, while in PD games defection dominates cooperation.
By contrast, SD and SH games possess a more complex composition of Nash equilibria. For SH, there are
bi–stable equilibria with players either all cooperating or all defecting. For SD, there are three polymorphic
equilibria with either players choosing opposite strategies (pii = 1 and pij = 0 or pii = 0 and pij = 1) or
players randomly switching between cooperating and defecting. Put another way, in SH and SD games
cooperation and defection may alternate or coexist.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 3: Information content hic() and partial information content mic() as a function of log() and for
different lines bisecting the uv parameter plane. The results are for landscapes of a well–mixed population
with N = 6 and d = 5. There are two diagonal bisections: (a),(c) u = v; (b),(d) u = −v, a vertical bisection:
(e),(g) v = −0.5, and a horizontal bisection: (f),(h) u = −0.5.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
(i) (j) (k) (l)
Figure 4: Comparison between the landscapes of well–mixed and structured populations as a function of
 and for different lines bisecting the uv parameter plane. Above each half–plane the corresponding social
dilemma is indicated, compare to Fig. 1. The difference in information content ∆hic = hic()str − hic()wm
and partial information content ∆mic = mic()str −mic()wm are shown for a typical structured population
with N = 6 and d = 2 and a well–mixed population with N = 6 and d = 5. There are two diagonal
bisections: (a),(c) u = v; (b),(d) u = −v, two vertical bisection: (e),(g) v = −0.5; (f),(h) v = 0.5, and two
horizontal bisection: (i),(k) u = −0.5; (j),(l) u = 0.5.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5: Violin plots of differences in information content hic between well–mixed and structured popula-
tions over interaction networks. The violins visualize the range and the distribution shape over interaction
networks. The differences are calculated over the complete square of the uv–plane by counting 30 equally
distanced values and recording the Kullback–Leibler distance, and for 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 2. (a): N = 4 (left) and
N = 6 (right); (b): N = 8; (c): N = 10; (d): N = 12.
Further results are shown in Fig. 3, which plots the information content hic() and the partial information
content mic() against log() for different lines bisecting the uv parameter plane. For hic(), we see typical
curves that start from a certain level of hic for  = 0, show a small maximum for  getting larger, before
sharply decreasing to hic() = 0. Similar curves have been reported for analyzing other landscapes [10, 11,
19, 21], albeit mostly with the increase to the maximum more prominent. The results reported in Fig. 3
have some similarity to those for step functions [10] and NK landscapes with a small value of epistatic
interactions [21], which might be explained by these landscapes and the binary landscapes obtained for
coevolutionary games mostly sharing a rather moderate ruggedness and flat areas. This goes along with
hic(0) being always significantly higher than log6(2) = 0.3869, which indicates that all landscapes contain
some neutrality. Also for the partial information content mic we obtain curves similar to other landscape
analyses, with the largest values for  = 0 that sink to mic() = 0 for  increasing. There are some further
conclusions with respect to expectable game dynamics that can be drawn. For instance, the landscapes
across different social dilemmas are subtly different. This becomes particularly visible by comparing the
results along the different lines bisecting the uv–plane. Along the bisection v = u, Fig. 3a,c traversing H
and PD games, we obtain very steep descents characterizing a rather smooth landscape, which corresponds
to game dynamics where players either all cooperate (H) or all defect (PD). In contrast, along the bisection
v = −u, Fig. 3b,d we find far less steep descents, particularly close to the start and end points at v = −1
and v = 1. This means the game landscape is much more rugged, which corresponds to the more complex
composition of Nash equilibria for SD and SH games. These conclusions are supported by looking at bisection
that cut the uv–plane vertically or horizontally. See, for instance, Fig. 3e,g traversing H and SD games at
v = −0.5. Again, H games (−1 < u < 0) produce steeper descents than SD (0 < u < 1). For the horizontal
cut u = −0.5, Fig. 3f,h, we move from H to SH games and obtain results almost symmetric to the vertical
one. However, note the slightly different steepness at u = 1 (Fig. 3e) as compared to v = 1 (Fig. 3f), which
may suggest that also SD and SH games produce slight differences in the ruggedness of the underlying game
landscapes. Additional work should be done to analyze these differences.
After establishing general differences and similarities between the landscape measures of structured and
well–mixed populations, we next study how they vary. Fig. 4 depicts differences in the information content
and the partial information content, ∆hic = hic()str − hic()wm and ∆mic = mic()str − mic()wm. The
results are for a typical structured and a well–mixed population with N = 6 and either d = 2 or d = 5 over
log() and different bisections of the uv–plane. In fact, Fig. 4 views the curves in Fig. 3 from atop, but now
the difference between the curves for a structured and a well–mixed case are shown. Thus, the left–right
half–planes in Fig. 4 correspond to respective social dilemmas, as marked above each half, also compare to
Fig. 1. Generally, hic() and mic() are equal or slightly larger for structured as compared to well–mixed,
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as can be seen by the yellow, orange and ocher areas. However, for −4.5 < log() < −2, where hic and mic
fall to zero and differences in the descent define ∆hic and ∆mic, there are green and blue areas indicating
that the information content for the well–mixed population is much larger than that for the structured
population. This allows to conclude that for the structured case either the fall to zero comes for smaller
values of log() or the decent is steeper. Additional experiments (not depicted due to brevity) have shown
that the differences mainly stem from an earlier fall to zero and not from larger differences in steepness.
These results underline the substantial differences in the game landscapes over population structures, which
is a major indicator for differences in game dynamics. Another interesting result are the differences over
social dilemmas, as the quantities ∆hic and ∆mic differ over log() and along the lines in the uv–plane.
An exception from this rule is the diagonal u = v encompassing H and PD games, which is the same for
all −1 ≤ v ≤ 1 (Fig. 4a,c). This exception only applies to exactly the line u = v. Small perturbations
to this line show again variation over log() and v. However, the differences also show a substantial degree
of symmetry. This becomes particularly visible by looking at how the large negative differences in ∆hic
and ∆mic (indicated by the blue and green areas) vary over log() and the bisections. We see that the
values of log() fall substantially from SD to SH (Fig. 4b,d), from SD to H (Fig. 4e,g) and from SD to
PD (Fig. 4j,l) and more weakly from PD to SH (Fig. 4f,h) and from H to SH (Fig. 4i,k). In other words,
they rise towards the north–west corner of the uv–plane and fall towards the south–east corner. In short,
together with the south–west–to–north–east symmetry of the information content, see Fig. 2, this allows
to differentiate between all 4 types of social dilemmas. Moreover, although there are differences in how
∆hic and ∆mic vary over log() and bisections, they scale in a very similar manner. In other words, ∆mic
frequently gives redundant information as compared to ∆hic, which may suggest that these game landscapes
are not marked by distinct flatness.
We round off the discussion about differences in the landscapes of well–mixed and structured populations
by studying the distributions over different interaction networks. Fig. 5 shows violin plots over N and d.
Here, we see for N = {4, 6, 8, 10, 12} and 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 2 the distribution shapes for differences between
the information content hic. The results for mic are similar and not shown due to brevity. We measure the
differences over the complete square of the uv–plane by counting 30 equally distanced values and recording
the Kullback–Leibler distance. The number of bins for the histograms showing the distribution shapes in
the violins is calculated according to the Freedman–Diaconis rule. We see for all N and d variety over
different interaction networks. The differences are very small for N = 4 and d = 2, Fig. 5a, which is
due to the fact that there are only L2(4) = 3 instances, with two of them producing the same result. For
N = {6, 8}, Fig. 5a,b, we get distribution shapes that cover a larger range, look rather different from normal
distributions, and mostly show similar frequencies over the range of the histogram with small tails at both
ends, particularly for N = 8. For N = {10, 12}, Fig. 5c,d, the distribution shapes are again different.
We get frequencies that change irregularly with large outburst next to constrictions over the range of the
histogram. A possible explanation for these results is that the distributions recorded are for just a tiny and
not sufficiently representative sample of all interaction networks. While for N = {4, 6, 8} all or almost all
interaction networks are tested, the bound G = 8.500 becomes small compared to Ld(10) and Ld(12). The
constrictions may simply stand for interaction networks that are not in the test set. Further work is needed to
understand how the landscapes for a well–mixed population (where all players interact with all other players)
differs from one for a structured population (where there are restriction as to who–interacts-with–whom)
and also how the variety changes over interaction networks, and players and coplayers.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, an analysis of coevolutionary game landscapes by their information content has been presented.
This involves studying the landscapes across a parameter plane encompassing a continuum of different social
dilemmas, including frequently studied games such as prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD), stag hunt
(SH), or harmony (H). The study additionally considers different interaction networks modeled by d–regular
graphs. It was shown that the information content allows to differentiate between different social dilemmas
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and also between well–mixed and structured populations. For well–mixed populations there is a substantial
amount of work on fixation properties and the conditions of cooperation, but there is also ample evidence that
the evolutionary dynamics differs over the graph structure of interaction networks for structured populations,
and particularity from the complete graph representing a well–mixed population [4, 8, 18]. The landscape
analysis proposed here offers another approach to study the question of whether and how structured and
well–mixed populations vary and may therefore provide an explanatory framework for experimental and
theoretical results on fixation and cooperation.
A next step is to link the results of the landscape analysis to fixation properties. This has been done
for one typical PD and one typical SD game [16] and showed substantial correlations between landscape
measures and fixation probability and time. However, such experiments are somehow impeded by the fact
that the computational costs of calculating fixation probabilities grow exponentially with the number of
players [9]. A possible remedy and alternative to a direct computation might be an approximation recently
proposed [6] that allows calculation in polynomial time.
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